Similarity, isomorphism or duality? Recent survey evidence on the human resource management policies of multinational corporations by Brewster, Chris et al.
Middlesex University Research Repository
An open access repository of
Middlesex University research
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk
Brewster, Chris and Brookes, Michael and Wood, Geoffrey (2008)
Similarity, isomorphism or duality? Recent survey evidence on the
human resource management policies of multinational corporations.
British Journal of Management, 19 (4). pp. 320-342. ISSN 1045-3172 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2007.00546.x
Available from Middlesex University’s Research Repository at
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/1087/
Copyright:
Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically.
Copyright and moral rights to this thesis/research project are retained by the author and/or 
other copyright owners. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for 
commercial gain is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, 
non-commercial, research or study without prior permission and without charge. Any use of 
the thesis/research project for private study or research must be properly acknowledged with
reference to the work’s full bibliographic details.
This thesis/research project may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or extensive 
quotations taken from it, or its content changed in any way, without first obtaining permission
in writing from the copyright holder(s).
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact 
the Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address:
eprints@mdx.ac.uk
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated.
 1 
 
 
SIMILARITY, ISOMORPHISM OR DUALITY? RECENT SURVEY 
EVIDENCE ON THE HRM POLICIES OF MNCS 
 
 
Chris Brewster 
Henley Management College,  
Greenlands,  
Henley-on-Thames,  
Oxfordshire, RG9 AU,  
UK 
Tel: +44 01491 414529 
e-mail: chris.brewster@henleymc.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Geoffrey Wood, 
The Management School 
The University of Sheffield 
9 Mappin Street 
Sheffield, S1 4DT 
UK 
+44 114 222 3346 
g.t.wood@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Michael Brookes,  
Middlesex University,  
The Burroughs,  
Hendon,  
London, NW4 4BT  
UK 
Tel: +44 (0)20 8411 6632 
e-mail: m.brookes@mdx.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
SIMILARITY, ISOMORPHISM OR DUALITY? RECENT SURVEY 
EVIDENCE ON THE HRM POLICIES OF MNCS 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
There is considerable debate as to the determinants of the HR policies of HRM: do they reflect 
national institutional or cultural realities, emerging common global practices, parent country 
effects, or the dual effects of trans-national and national realities? This paper uses an extensive 
international database to explore these differences, assessing variations in a range of HR 
practices. It finds new evidence of national differences in the manner in which indigenous firms 
manage their people, but also evidence of a similarity in practice amongst MNCs. In other 
words, MNCs tend to manage their human resources in ways that are distinct from those of their 
host country; at the same time, country of origin effects seem relatively weak. Whilst there is 
some evidence of common global practices, sufficient diversity in practice persists to suggest 
that duality theories may provide the most appropriate explanation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the human resource management (HRM) policies and practices followed by 
multinational corporations (MNCs) within host countries. It addresses the issues of similarity 
and difference: to what extent do MNCs import their own approaches to host countries, to what 
extent do they adopt those of the host country or, perhaps, where do they fall between these two 
extremes? How different are they from their local indigenous counterparts and how are we to 
explain these positions?   
 
There is an extensive debate on these issues. Three broad schools of thought can be identified 
(see Figure 1). First, there are theories that suggest that MNCs will tend to follow common 
practices whichever country they are in, either because of global homogeneity or because of 
ethnocentricity. In either case the implications is that the geographic host country will have little 
effect. Second, there are theories of local isomorphism, arguing that firms will invariably adjust 
their policies to reflect prevailing cultural and/or institutional realities in the countries in which 
they operate.  Thirdly, duality theories would suggest that firms face conflicting pressures both 
towards and away from the local practices, which may be exacerbated by regulatory issues or 
rational determinants such as size, structure, market conditions and/or the strategic choices made 
by managers. 
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Figure 1: Theories of international HRM practice 
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HRM, as the practice most commonly “localised” (Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994), is likely to be 
a key test-bed for such theories. Using extensive international survey data, we aim to shed 
further light on the relevance of each of these theories for explaining the specific HR strategies 
and policies followed by MNCs‟ subsidiaries in specific host countries, and the underlying 
causes of the choices made. The paper explores these three schools of thought, attempts a 
summary and examines the employment practice implications of these debates. The 
methodology and the database used to identify empirical evidence on these issues is explained, 
relevant findings are presented and conclusions are drawn about the extent of similarity, 
isomorphism and duality.  
 
 
CONVERGENCE OR SIMILARITY THEORIES 
 
Theories of Globalisation.  
The term "globalisation" is widely deployed and often differently understood: in most accounts it 
refers to the recent process of unification that has taken place in markets and consumer tastes, 
increasingly mobile investor capital, and rapid technological change. Within and between firms, 
actions are increasingly grounded in a perspective that views the whole world as being nationless 
and borderless (Ohmae, 1990, 1996).  
 
Whilst acknowledging that we start from regionally based economic systems, globalisation 
theories hold that economies are becoming globally integrated, resulting in the proliferation of 
global management structures, and the convergence of management techniques around shared 
notions of "best practice" (Sera, 1992). This has placed renewed pressures on firms to enhance 
their competitiveness. As their power to set prices is eroded in the face of competition, 
profitability increasingly depends on cutting the costs of inputs and enhancing productivity.  
Firms that operate across national boundaries are most exposed to the forces of globalization, 
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and hence, are most likely to fall in line with dominant world-wide practices aimed at enhancing 
competitiveness in world markets. 
 
There is a body of literature that focuses on the role of the multinational firm, and the desire to 
promote integrated international standards, versus pressures to be locally responsive (Ashkenas, 
Ulrich, Jick and Kerr, 1995; Hamal and Prahalad, 1985; Yip, 1995; Kim and Gray, 2005).  The 
ability to deploy similar organizational practices worldwide, and to utilize the capacities of the 
entire firm, is likely to encourage greater homogenisation on efficiency grounds (Kostova and 
Roth, 2002; Zeira and Harari, 1977). Grounded in the rational choice tradition, this perspective 
assumes that firms pursue economic advantage through choices "guided by unambiguous 
preferences and bounded rationality" (Gooderham et al., 1999: 507). Industries will adopt 
practices that promote the maximisation of economic goals; this will result in a set of best 
practices diffusing across the parent economy and worldwide. Whilst the diffusion process may 
be slow or uneven, this will make for inter-industry and international practices that are to a large 
degree uniform. Firms will either try to enforce their own view of the most efficient ways of 
handling HRM in other countries; or they will all gradually drift towards HRM policies that 
mirror the most efficient, the US, model (Jain et al., 1998; McDonough, 2003; Smith and 
Meiksins, 1995).  
 
The process of globalisation is a two facetted one, leading to increased competition on global 
product markets and increased cooperation in the form of joint ventures, reciprocal share 
ownership and tight subcontracting (McDonough, 2003). Global markets create new 
homogenous environments where the conditions in which companies operate become similar in 
terms of products, competition and the rate of technological change (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 
2001). Global competition places greater demands on the co-ordination of resources, equipment, 
finance and people (Sparrow, Brewster and Harris, 2004). For example, it is important to co-
ordinate pricing, service and product support worldwide as a multinational customer can 
compare prices in different regions. In response, the global enterprise adopts a global business 
strategy transcending both internal (people, processes and structure) and external (time and 
country) factors (Parker, 1998). Traditional business boundaries become increasingly permeable, 
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accelerating the rate of convergence. Hence, in-firm practices become decoupled from setting, 
challenging national mindsets and assumptions (Sparrow and Hiltrop, 1997). 
  
Critics of the globalisation thesis have contested the assumption that globalisation represents a 
new or unprecedented process (Parker, 1998).  Others have suggested that even multinational 
firms are extremely local in terms of key areas such as employment practices: 85% of 
multinationals produce more than two-thirds of their output in their home market, with two-
thirds of their employees being nationals of their home country (Economist, 2000b).   Indeed, 
most MNCs cannot easily be defined as stateless (Hu, 1992); the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) index of transnationality lists only six organizations scoring 
above 90 out of a 100
i
.    
   
Theories of Ethnocentricity.   
Alternatively, it can be argued that specific MNCs will tend towards ethnocentricity, mirroring 
the dominant practices of the country of origin (Zeira and Harari, 1977) and applying them 
wherever they operate (see, eg, Bae et al., 1998; Ferner, 1997; Horwitz and Smith, 1998; Ngo et 
al., 1998). It has been proposed that MNCs might adopt different approaches towards human 
resource management in such circumstances (see, eg, Perlmutter, 1969, and Heenan and 
Perlmutter, 1979, who argue that MNCs tend to adopt one of four main approaches towards 
human resource management: ethnocentric; polycentric; regional; and geocentric).  Later writers 
such as Mayrhofer and Brewster (1996) argued that, in practice, the vast majority of firms are 
ethnocentric. Similarly, Lao and Ngo (2001) suggest that the country of origin of MNCs is likely 
to have a significant impact on their practices in other countries. 
 
Theories of Localisation 
Institutional Theories. Institutional theories suggest that organizations sharing the same 
environment will gradually adopt similar characteristics, and hence become "isomorphic" with 
each other (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Three forms of isomorphism may be identified: coercive 
(where the firm is forced to adopt specific practices); mimetic (specific practices associated with 
success are adopted to avoid uncertainty) or normative (behaviour considered appropriate to the 
Formatted
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environment) (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983).  Firms will conform to both the formal rules and 
unwritten norms of specific institutional contexts both for efficiency and legitimacy (Haveman, 
1993; Kostova and Roth, 2002; Marsden, 1999). Social transactions remain embedded in specific 
social contexts (Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997). This is likely to encourage the adoption of 
certain practices and discourage others within a particular context; those seen to be successful 
will be taken on board by other firms and those associated with failure discarded (Haveman, 
1993). Contingent on the nature of their embeddedness – the extent to which specific practices 
are likely to be seen to be the most appropriate or "done thing" - there will be variations in the 
forms of governance and management. Conceptions of fairness and related societal norms will 
impact on even the most insular management style, and influence income differentials and the 
relative amount of resources allocated to the different strata of management (Boyer and 
Hollingsworth, 1997). This is reflected directly in the HR literature too (Boxall, 1999; Brewster, 
2001; Brewster, Mayrhofer and Morley, 2004; De Cieri and Dowling, 1999; Ferner and 
Qunitanilla, 1998; Saka, 2002). The varieties of capitalism literature suggests that particular 
patterns of corporate governance are likely to predominate in national contexts reflecting the 
embedded nature of practices, and the need to for effective organizational interaction and 
cooperation within a particular national setting  (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Dore, 2000; Lincoln 
and Kalleberg, 1990). 
 
The regulationist critique of the varieties of capitalism literature suggests that whilst specific 
features of production regimes may indeed be complementary, regulation can never completely 
eliminate imbalances (Boyer, 2001; Hopner, 2005). As Marsden (1999) notes, whether in the 
form of legislation or informal practices, rules make for greater efficiency, in that parties to a 
deal can take much for granted. Whilst firms may be quick to take on board international 
innovations, they will, in turn, have different implications in different contexts (Boyer and 
Hollingsworth, 1997; Kostova and Roth, 2001; Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre, 1986). 
Regulationist accounts would link norms and habits with broader objective pressures towards 
compatibility with a national mode of regulation, or assembly of institutions designed to stabilise 
a specific growth process (Aglietta, 1998; Dacin, Ventresca and Beal, 1999; Grahl and Teague, 
2000). Such mediation is, however, likely to be temporally confined, and likely to be punctuated 
 9 
by interregnum periods of experimentation (Boyer, 2001). Individual behaviours need to be 
consistent with the dominant schema of production (Lipietz, 1986).  In specific national contexts, 
multinational firms may be encouraged to adopt particular sets of practices in line with national 
government policies and industrial strategies (and the associated needs of nationally-based large 
firms) or be granted a relatively free rein in an attempt to attract investment.  Again, the 
responses of key interests in society are likely to mould the practices adopted by MNCs‟ 
subsidiaries (Guillen, 2000). 
 
Hence, contemporary institutionalist accounts would suggest that MNCs‟ subsidiaries are likely 
to adopt similar HR practices to the countries in which they operate. However, regulationists 
would caution that the predominant practices within individual national settings are themselves 
prone to both evolution and rupture and that, owing to their disproportionate power, MNCs may 
be better equipped to contest any form of institutional mediation not in line with their changing 
interests.  
 
Cultural Perspectives. These critical institutional perspectives have been contrasted (Brewster, 
2004; Sorge, 2004) with the cultural approaches, most closely associated with the writings of 
authors such as Hofstede (1991), Fukuyama (1995) and Sako (1998). The latter writers accord 
particular prominence to the possibility that organizations represent "cultural communities" of 
rational utility maximizing individuals (c.f. Cooter, 2000). Variations in practices will be in line 
with different cultural contexts (rather than institutional setting), which will cut across national 
boundaries (Lao and Ngo, 2001): Bartlett and Ghoshal called this the pressure for “multi-
culturalism” within international organisations.   
 
Culturalism is a very broad school of thought. Key distinctions in different approaches to 
understanding culture in different natural settings are the concepts of etics and emics.  Etic 
approaches seek to "describe phenomena in constructs that apply across cultures" (Morris et al., 
1999: 782).  Regional or national variations in culture are described in terms of some general or 
external standard or yardstick.  Hence, Hofstede's (1980) framework for understanding cultural 
variations which seeks to identify key values, and the extent of variation thereof in different 
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national settings, is firmly rooted in the etic tradition (Morris et al 1999).  In contast, emic 
approaches hold that culture is best understood as an integrated whole or social system, rather 
than trying to identify specific components thereof (Giddens, 1990; Parsons, 1950); within this, 
individual and group understandings are societally and historically defined, and are best 
understood by attempting to see things from "the insider‟s point of view" (Morris et al., 1999: 
781).  Whilst sometimes deployed as alternative approaches (Helfich, 1999), emic and etics are 
not necessarily conflicting or alternative conceptualisations for understanding culture, 
convergence and difference on a comparative basis, but can be deployed in a complementary 
fashion: aspects of behaviour, for example, may incorporate both emic and etic dimensions 
(Berry, 1999; Helfich, 1999). 
 
What these approaches have in common is treating culture as a given; whilst it may be possible 
for a society to enhance its "social capital", it is not possible to develop social trust deliberately 
and systematically, or radically depart from established rules and norms (Fukuyama, 1995; Lane, 
1998). Culture is seen as a specific component of reality, shared by individuals as a means of 
conferring meaning, to add sense to social interactions. Whilst its composition may be relatively 
fluid and subjective, it provides a persistent boundary, horizon or "segment" to the life-world of 
individuals and group (Weber, 2000:207).   
 
Both institutional and cultural theories would suggest that the need for MNCs to obtain 
legitimacy or adapt their activities in specific contexts is likely to make for isomorphism in line 
with local practices (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Giacobbe-Miller et al., (2003) suggest that 
individual and group cultural orientations reflect specific cultural characteristics, whilst firms 
will vary within specific cultures according to institutional realities.  Hence, as with institutional 
accounts, cultural theories suggest that MNCs‟ subsidiaries are likely to adopt HR practices in 
line with their host country; however, they differ in that their conceptualisations of culture would 
suggest a greater degree of continuity in national practices than would be suggested by the 
former. 
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Duality Theories 
Duality theories suggest that firms face conflicting pressures towards global integration and local 
adaptation (Evans et al., 2002; Gooderham et al., 1998; Kostova and Roth, 2002: Rosenweig and 
Singh, 1991) and that the speed at which different sets of practices are diffused is likely to vary 
from context to context and may vary between practices (Guler et al., 2002; and, with specific 
reference to HRM, Hannon, Huang and Jaw, 1995; McGuaghey and De Cieri, 1999; Schuler, 
Dowling and de Cieri, 1993). Whilst firms may strive to homogenize activities across national 
boundaries in line with a global strategy, invariably countertendencies will impel firms to take 
account of local difference; the outcome will therefore incorporate both national and global 
dimensions. The organization's positioning on the nature and extent of adoption of local 
practices can be explained in terms of regulatory institutions, or rational determinants such as 
local market conditions, ownership structures, the state of the external market and/or behavioural 
or attitudinal variables and factors such as whether or not the local subsidiary is engaged in joint 
or licensing ventures with local partners (Davis et al., 2000).  
 
Rational Determinants - Local Market Conditions. The relative strength of local competitors 
may force firms to tailor their products to meet local taste or regulations, necessitating specific 
production policies. The ability of firms to establish a sustained competitive advantage is 
contingent on their ability to implement strategies that competitors are not immediately able to 
duplicate; such strategies vary from context to context (Park et al., 2003).  Marginson et al. 
(1993) suggest that the relative size of a firm may impact on practices; this would encompass 
relative receptiveness to external environmental pressures. Complex social systems, like human 
resource management systems, are not so easy to imitate and may be the best sources of 
competitive advantage (Pfeffer, 1994; Snell, Youndt & Wright, 1996; Ulrich & Lake, 1990; 
Wright & McMahan, 1992). 
 
Rational Determinants - Ownership Structures. In contrast to the Varieties of Capitalism 
literature that focus on a dominant mode of corporate governance within specific national 
contexts, MNCs may be characterized by an internal differentiation of management practices 
from national context to national context (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Pressures towards 
Formatted
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conformity with embedded local practices will be contingent not only on size, but also the firm‟s 
own ownership structures (Jain et al., 1998). Ownership structure will partially determine 
behaviour; will reflect whether the subsidiary is wholly or partially owned and the degree of 
integration or interdependence accorded to different parts of the firm.  Some organizations may 
be more sensitive to pressures of local adaptation, while others may be more prone to internal 
consistency. Within the same subsidiary, some management practices might closely follow the 
parent company ones, while others may more resemble those of the host country.  
 
Rational Determinants - Behavioural Variations and Strategic Choice. Symbiotic emic and etic 
approaches to cross-national research focus on the dialectic between the general and the spatially 
specific, and explore the extent to which concepts and actions simultaneously incorporate 
dimensions that have a universal applicability or are specific to a particular culture (Lamond et 
al., 2001).  Hence, behavioural variations of the duality perspective accord specific attention to 
variations in practice within the firm (Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994; Newbury, 2001).   
 
Practices should be seen in terms of the active agency of subsidiary management, and the degree 
of discretion accorded to it (Kostova and Roth, 2002). In turn, this would reflect overall 
organizational strategic orientations, and the relative importance attached to conformity. Whilst 
local managers are required to fit in and be legitimated by the organization, local legitimacy is 
also dependent on compliance with local institutions and norms. Compliance with the "ways of 
the country" may make for greater operational efficiency (Lee and Yarwood, 1983: 657). 
Successful host country nationals will provide alternative role models to parent country attitudes 
and behaviour amongst expatriate managers; these divergent pressures will impel the firm 
towards both the local and the international. 
 
Organizational outcomes will reflect the real choices made by individual actors, who may be 
more or less receptive to socialization in an attempt to behave in ways appropriate to their 
specific context (Lee and Larwood, 1983). Recurrent themes in the literature are the link 
between the strategy-structure configuration in MNEs and the competing demands for global 
integration and co-ordination versus local responsiveness (Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Bartlett and 
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Ghoshal, 1989: Porter, 1990). Where global integration and co-ordination is important, 
subsidiaries need to be globally integrated with other parts of the organisation or/and 
strategically co-ordinated by the parent. In contrast, where local responsiveness is important, 
subsidiaries should have far greater autonomy and there is less need for integration.   
 
Regulatory Institutions. Given variations in the power of national governments and firms, a sub-
school of regulationist thinking has highlighted the possibility of endemic dualities in practices; 
contradictory pressures exist towards greater homogenisation and localisation. Tickell and Peck, 
(1992: 355) argue that a global tendency towards reduced state involvement and liberalization 
has led to a reduction of "market distortions" that had previously included redistributive policies 
aimed at alleviating the plight of regions that faced long-term crises of competitiveness. 
Contrary to predictions of homogenisation, this has forced a greater divergence in practices, as 
firms operating in peripheral regions are increasingly forced to compete on cost grounds, 
resulting in a greater tendency towards lower value added policies than in core areas (c.f. 
Collinge, 1999). Similarly, Boyer and Hollingsworth (1997) suggest that institutions are nested 
at a range of levels – supra-national, national, and sub-national – leading to simultaneous 
pressures towards convergence and difference. The relative effects of one or the other reflect 
specific spatial and temporal dynamics.  Whilst it can be argued that the growing reach of 
international organizations has meant that certain issues are governed across national 
boundaries, pressures towards the adoption of neo-liberal policies have in some cases been 
checked by powerful regional blocs such as the EU, or by individual nations in a relatively 
strong bargaining position (Haworth and Hughes, 2003).   
 
All of the general management arguments cited above are replicated in the specific debates about 
HRM (see Edwards and Ferner, 2002 for a review).  Certain rational, behavioural and 
regulationist accounts all point to simultaneous pressures towards a greater homogeneity and 
localisation in HR practice; however the latter would place particular emphasis on the uneven 
and episodic nature of these pressures, making for a greater degree of variation in practice rather 
than the emergence of an enduring HR order as a result of specific organizational environments 
and choices. 
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Defining Features of Employment Practices 
Empirical exploration of these issues is hampered by the lack of agreement as to what should be 
included in HRM systems. There are two commonly cited taxonomies of defining features of 
national HR systems and practice to be found in the literature.  The more inclusive list is found 
within the contemporary HRM texts, centring on the most commonly encountered functional 
areas of the modern HR department. Hence, to take examples from the two seminal HRM 
textbooks, Fombrun, Tichy and Devanna, 1984 focus on personnel selection, an appraisal 
system, a system of rewards and a development system, whilst Beer et al (1984) discuss 
employee “flows” (into, through and out of the organisation), employee influence mechanisms 
and rewards as the key HRM policy choices. These kinds of lists have been replicated since: for 
example, Storey (2001:16) argues that there are four key “heartland activities" of people 
management: employee involvement and communication; the management of reward; training 
and development; and recruitment and retention (c.f. Guest 1997).  An assumption in many of 
these “universalist” texts (Brewster, 1999) is that these functional areas will, or perhaps should, 
operate similarly in all environments.    
 
A variation of functional area approaches focuses on the relationship between HR practices, and 
overall competitive strategies of the firm.  With a starting point that HRM potentially represents 
a source of real competitive advantage, and that firms will seek to match HRM with overall 
strategies, a focus has been on the relative presence of high performance work systems; in other 
words, orientated towards an evaluation of the extent of the presence of what may be seen as 
flexible as adverse to administrative approaches to people management (Huselid, 1995; Tessema 
and Soeters, 2006). Such analyses have been founded on a comprehensive exploration of all the 
functional areas of HRM for the relative presence of practices that may be seen to be falling into 
the high performance category, examples being performance related reward systems, 
mechanisms for involving employees for enhancing product quality, and relative skills and 
qualifications profiles and investment in development (Huselid, 1995: 646).   This has led to the 
refinement of measuring instruments that identify the relative extent of high performance work 
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practices as a means of exploring the internal coherence of organizations and their ultimate 
orientation (Huselid, 1995; Tessema and Soeters, 2006). However, any listing of HR practices is 
necessarily a contentious business, reflecting differing approaches towards theory and 
conceptualizations of strategy (Guest, 1997).  There is much to commend research building on 
such approaches. However, strategy formulation may be bounded: in other words, how firms 
manage their people may less reflect a process of autonomous and rational strategic choice, but 
be moulded by existing relationships within and beyond the firm; what HR policies and practices 
are most functional in a particular time and place will depend on the broader social and 
regulatory context (Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 2001).  Moreover, whilst providing sound 
mechanisms for measuring the extent of high performance work systems, the absence thereof 
does not necessarily denote an uniformity in people management practice: for example, an 
important distinction can be drawn between patriarchal (autocratic management policies, 
coupled with informal rights and obligations) approaches and autocratic fordism (with a greater 
emphasis on formal rules and procedures, and standardized control mechanisms) (Webster and 
Wood, 2005).   
 
Hence, much of the contemporary varieties of capitalism literature focuses on the bonds that 
exist between employee and firm, and the extent to which genuine power is devolved within the 
organization (Amable, 2003; Whitley, 1999; Thelen, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001). This reflects 
an abiding concern with dominant modes of internal corporate governance, and related issues of 
power and equity (Hopner 2005); it emphasizes the differences between countries in the way in 
the way that organizations relate to their employees (Thelen 2001).    A limitation of such 
approaches is that they may ignore the shifting dynamics of power and interests in society at 
large (Hyman, 2002:65; Roe, 2003). For example, the accession to power of a more conservative 
government may encourage firms to adopt more hardline approaches regarding issues such as 
redundancies, even if the basic HR processes and procedures remain generally intact (c.f. Roe, 
2003).  A second limitation is that relations at the workplace are about conflict and contestation, 
reflecting the actions of individuals; for example, mechanisms for employee participation may 
be founded on genuine cooperation, or simply represent another forum for trench warfare 
between management and employees (Hyman 2002: 66).  Nonetheless, they represent a basic 
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starting point for any analysis that sees internal relations within firms in a context of wider social 
relations, and hence are particularly compatible with broader institutional analyses, and indeed, 
alternative structural-cultural accounts. We have, therefore, chosen a relationship-based 
approach as a starting point for our analysis, building on a growing body of earlier relevant 
research in this area (c.f. Gooderham et al. 1998; Brewster et al., 2006; Brookes et al., 2005; 
Whitley, 1999). Any list of HR practices necessarily incorporates an element of selectivity 
(Guest, 1997); our focusing on relations both facilitates analysis, and highlights differences and 
commonalities in a range of relevant areas.   At the same time, we acknowledge that an 
alternative functional areas approach, exploring the operation of practices such as selection and 
recruitment, and reward systems in relation to wider organizational strategies, could shed further 
light on the effects of firm context and practice, and would form a fertile area for future research, 
particularly as it would facilitate comparisons with earlier work on the relative effects of 
different approaches to HRM (Guest, 1997; Huselid, 1995). 
 
We centre our analysis on the two core features identified by Whitley (1999; c.f. Thelen, 2000). 
The first of these, the degree of employer-employee interdependence encompasses two sub-
dimensions: a) the willingness of the organization to invest in its people - the extent to which the 
organization is committed to training and development, and b) the relative security of tenure 
enjoyed by employees (Whitley, 1999: 38; see also Marsden, 1999; Storey, 2001) - the dominant 
contracts used by the firm (e.g. permanent, temporary or fixed term), the regularity with which 
the firm makes use of redundancies, the methods employed to reduce staff numbers, and the use 
of subcontractors. The second feature identified by Whitley is the amount of delegation to 
employees. This concerns issues such as the degree to which managers are willing to allow 
employees greater discretion in the performance of tasks, the extent to which employers bargain 
with employee representatives, and mechanisms for involvement and feedback. This is 
summarised in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Defining Feature of HRM Practice 
 
 
Feature  Sub-Dimensions 
Employer-Employee Interdependence 
 
 Training and Development 
(Proportion of employees to recently 
receive further training, amount of 
organizational resources devoted to training 
and development) 
 Security of Tenure (Forms of 
contract, prevalence of downsizing, use of 
outsourced labour) 
Delegation to Employees  Representative Participation 
(Collective Bargaining, Works Councils) 
 Financial Participation 
 Functional Participation and 
Upward communication 
 Effectiveness of Formal 
Downward Communication 
(Whitley 1999) 
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This paper tests whether, and the extent to which, the practices of MNCs tend to be similar 
across a range of countries and different from the dominant ways of managing people in those 
countries. If MNCs do indeed practice HR management in similar ways worldwide, this would 
reflect the effects of some common homogenizing pressure (“globalisation”). Given the 
evidence that HRM is most likely to be an exemplar of practices at one end of the localisation 
scale (Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994), it was decided to test the veracity of the similarity, 
isomorphic and duality accounts, by testing the following hypotheses: 
 
H1:  HRM practices will mirror those of the country in which they are domiciled, reflecting the 
effects of local institutional configurations and/or culture. 
 
H2: HRM practices in MNC subsidiaries will mirror the HRM practices in their country of 
origin. 
 
H3: HRM practices in MNCs exemplify a common model, reflecting the effects of 
globalization, to which transnational organizations are the most exposed.  
 
H4:  HRM practices in MNC subsidiaries vary from context to context, reflecting the relative 
strengths of home country versus host country institutions.   
 
In short, we aim to test for similarity, isomorphism or duality and to suggest some explanations 
for the findings.  
 
 
METHOD 
 
The data employed in this paper are from the repeating Cranet survey, which now contains 
evidence on human resource management issues of private and public organizations in 22 
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European countries, as well as some dozen others (Brewster, Mayrhofer and Morley, 2004). The 
survey targets organizations that employ more than 200 employees. In a few smaller countries 
however the survey targets organizations that employ more than 100 employees: about 20% of 
the observations in the survey involve organizations that employ less than 200 employees (and 
these have been included in the current paper). About 70% of the survey returns have been 
completed by the most senior personnel or human resource manager. The other observations 
involve less senior specialists in the same field or the chief executive or the company secretary. 
Because the questions asked are mainly factual (yes/no, numbers or percentages) and because we 
test the data comparatively, and not against internal “outcomes”, the problem of single 
respondent bias is reduced: we acknowledge that the respondents may consistently over or 
underestimate data, but there seems to be no reason to expect that respondents in different 
countries or different types of organisation would do that. The overall response rate for the 
survey has varied over the years of collection from 22% to 15%, good for an all-population 
survey and comparable to rates for similar surveys (Tregaskis et al., 2004).  
 
The data set used in this paper contains results from the 1999/2000 survey in 19 European 
countries
ii
. Japan, a country that is often, together with Scandinavia and Germany, often held up 
as a typical example of a more collaborative variety of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001), and 
hence is included in this article. The data for all these countries includes at least 100 
observations; in total there are 6,939 private sector companies in our sample. The data is broadly 
representative with respect to the industrial sector in every country. However, because the data is 
not evenly distributed over the countries, the survey is not representative for the overall area 
covered. 
  
The fundamental purpose of the paper is to determine the balance between the impact of host 
country, country of origin and MNC status on the HRM practices of MNCs, Table 2 indicates a 
framework to categorize the behaviour of organizations; applying these allows for a relatively 
straightforward proposal to be tested: that different types of firm are similar in terms of their 
interdependence and delegation. Testing this hypothesis allows us to also examine the issues of 
similarity, isomorphism and duality. 
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Table 2: Convergence, Isomorphism or Duality? : Competing Accounts 
 
General Trend Associated 
Paradigms 
Key Tendency HR Practices 
Convergence with 
Parent Country or 
Global Trends 
 
 
Parent country 
model/ 
ethnocentrism 
 
 
Globalisation  
Theories 
MNCs will mirror practices in 
parent country on grounds of 
efficiency and/or 
ethnocentricity 
 
 
Global convergence 
The spread of country of origin 
practices worldwide 
 
 
An emerging global model for 
managing people 
 
Isomorphism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Duality Theories 
 
Institutional 
theories 
(including 
some 
regulationist 
approaches) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emic and Etic 
theories 
 
 
 
 
Rationalist 
approaches 
 
 
 
Regulationist 
theories of 
space and 
scale 
 
 
Practices will follow the host 
country, reflecting institutional 
configurations/ or specific 
mode of regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
Practices will follow the 
dominant culture (whether 
defined objectively [etic] or 
subjectively [emic]) of the 
country in which the MNC is 
domiciled 
 
Specific organizational and 
external environments make 
for specific sets of choices 
towards or away from global 
homogenization 
 
A contested process of 
homogenization and 
localisation.  Firms may be 
impelled towards localisation 
of practices and/or towards an 
emerging global model and/or 
towards parent country 
practices. 
 
People management is likely to differ 
from national context to context.  The 
existence of a limited number of 
systemic archetypes is likely to make 
for a limited number of national models 
of HR practice.  These models are 
subject to evolution and/or rupture and 
reconstitution. 
 
Fixed modes of HR practice in line 
with prevailing realities 
 
 
 
 
A mix between the global and the local 
in HR practices. The possibility of an 
“optimal” balance? 
 
HR practices within MNCs will 
incorporate aspects of both the global 
and the local. An optimal and similar 
balance between local and international 
ways of managing people is unlikely to 
be encountered in MNCs operating in 
different parts of the world. 
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The process is that for each of the sub-dimensions indicated in Table 2 an empirical model is 
estimated. Variables from the Cranet survey representing each of the sub-dimensions are used as 
the dependent variable of a model and estimated as a function of size, industrial sector and 
country in which the establishment is located. Where the dependent variable is a continuous 
variable the model is estimated using ordinary least squares
iii
 and where the dependent variable 
is binary a logit model is used
iv
. 
  
Once the various models have been estimated they can be re-estimated for different sub-samples 
of the data, i.e. domestic firms and foreign-owned MNCs, and a straightforward structural test 
can be applied. If the models are estimated separately for domestic firms and foreign-owned 
MNC‟s and there is no real difference in the behaviour of the two groups of firms there should 
be no statistically significant difference between the estimated results from the individual sub-
samples and the results for the overall sample when the two sub-samples are pooled together.
v
                 
 
For the explanatory variables, size is measured by the number of employees in the establishment, 
sectoral differences are controlled for by creating 16 sectoral dummies and country differences 
are controlled for by creating a dummy variable for each of the 20 countries. A full list of the 
variables is reproduced in the Appendix. The empirical analysis requires estimating 45 different 
models, i.e. each of the 15 sub-dimensions for the pooled, domestic and foreign samples, so 
clearly a large amount of results are generated. Consequently, in the interests of clarity, a sample 
of the regression results is included in the Appendix (the full set of results are available on 
request), and the discussion will focus upon the structural tests summarised in Table 4. 
 
FINDINGS 
The crux of the analysis is to establish whether the HRM practices of MNCs‟ subsidiaries are 
similar to or different from those of their host nation. The behaviour of the organisations are 
categorised on the basis of a number of indicators of interdependence and delegation. Table 3 
records the means, standard deviations and numbers of observations of these variables for the 20 
countries included in the analysis, but separated into those firms operating in their own country 
and those MNCs operating abroad. 
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Table 3: Interdependence and Delegation: descriptive statistics 
 
  
  
Domestic Firms 
  
Foreign-owned MNC's 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
No. 
Obs. 
Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
No. 
Obs. 
Interdependence             
Proportion of wage bill 
spent on training 2.8 2.89 3772 3.29 2.83 747 
Proportion of employees 
having training in the last 
year 42.42 31.06 4583 53.98 31.47 922 
Formal analysis of 
training needs (yes/no) 0.643 0.48 5837 0.8 0.4 1102 
Number of employees has 
decreased in last 3 years 
(yes/no) 0.08 0.26 5837 0.05 0.21 1102 
% Decrease in employee 
s 16.54 18.58 4231 21.85 22.38 
808 
 
Harsher methods 
employed to decrease 
workforce (yes/no) 0.55 0.49 5837 0.62 0.48 1102 
Greater use of more 
numerically flexible 
employment {i.e. an 
ability to rapidly upsize 
or downsize} (yes/no) 0.57 0.49 5837 0.69 0.46 1102 
Proportion of workforce 
temporary 2.58 1.34 5349 2.84 1.32 1027 
Proportion of workforce 
with fixed term contracts 2.8 1.41 5421 2.81 1.35 1025 
Delegation             
Pay bargaining above the 
establishment level 
(yes/no) 0.76 0.42 5837 0.7 0.46 1102 
Financial Participation 
(yes/no) 0.58 0.49 5837 0.71 0.45 1102 
Union penetration 4.36 2.02 5712 3.9 2.12 1084 
Non-bargaining 
representation (yes/no) 0.68 0.46 5837 0.61 0.49 1102 
Change in upward 
communication in last 3 
years (yes/no) 0.66 0.47 5837 0.76 0.43 1102 
Change in downward 
formal communication in 
last 3 years (yes/no) 0.81 0.39 5837 0.89 0.32 1102 
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Preliminary observation does suggest that foreign-owned MNCs behave differently to locally 
owned firms (including local MNCs): for example, they appear to spend more on training, train 
more people, are more likely to evaluate training needs, etc. However, it is difficult to establish 
from the raw data whether these differences are significant and if they reflect the differing 
circumstances facing the observed firms. Consequently, multivariate analysis is applied and the 
various models outlined in the method section are estimated and then tested for structural 
differences. 
 
Table 4 records the method of estimation, the calculated test statistic and whether the null 
hypothesis of domestic and foreign firms behaving the same way can be accepted, for each of the 
15 models. These results indicate that foreign-owned MNCs generally behave in a different 
fashion to domestic firms, since the null hypothesis is rejected in all but one case. Thus, the 
effects of country of domicile isomorphism seems limited: what MNCs do in their host country 
is generally different to their indigenous counterparts.  Hyphothesis 1 is therefore rejected. Host 
country institutions or culture do not seem to be generally effective in making MNCs more 
“local” in their practices; this would reflect more powerful effects of institutional pressures in 
their country of origin, or the emergence of a common model of practice amongst MNCs 
worldwide, or considerable diversity, reflecting variations in the effectiveness of host versus 
parent country institutional restraints.  
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Table 4: Structural Tests: Domestic Firms (MNCs and non-MNCs)  Vs. Foreign MNC’s 
Dependent Variable 
Mode
l 
Type 
Test 
Stat. Accept/Reject 
Interdependence       
Proportion of wage bill spent on training OLS 1.46 Reject at 5% 
Proportion of employees having training in the last 
year OLS 4.86 Reject at 1% 
Formal analysis of training needs Logit 104.9 Reject at 1% 
Number of employees has decreased in last 3 years Logit 25.3 Accept 
% Decrease in employees OLS 2.7 Reject at 1% 
Methods employed to decrease workforce Logit 65.5 Reject at 1% 
Greater use of more flexible employment Logit 83.1 Reject at 1% 
Proportion of workforce temporary OLS 2.52 Reject at 1% 
Proportion of workforce with fixed term contracts OLS 1.81 Reject at 1% 
Delegation       
Pay bargaining above the establishment level Logit 62.5 Reject at 1% 
Financial Participation Logit 96.6 Reject at 1% 
Union penetration OLS 3.69 Reject at 1% 
Non-bargaining representation Logit 58.9 Reject at 1% 
Change in upward communication in last 3 years Logit 51.9 Reject at 1% 
Change in downward formal communication in last 3 
years Logit 77.3 Reject at 1% 
 
 
However, it must be conceded that the predictive power of the models is fairly low, generally in 
the region of 10-20%. In fact, differences in size and sector account for about 2% of the variation 
in the dependent variables. So these only have a small effect upon interdependence and 
delegation, whilst host country has a larger effect though still relatively small
vi
. The majority of 
the variation in delegation and interdependence results from factors unobserved in the data set. 
Since these unobserved differences appear to affect domestic firms and foreign-owned MNCs in 
a different way, and since the models are already controlled for at the country level, the 
influences must be forces operating at a range of levels or primarily at an international level. The 
former would suggest the presence of duality and the latter would indicate similarities cutting 
across national boundaries: in other words, hypotheses 2, 3 or 4 may be correct. 
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These alternative hypotheses can also be tested since the domestic samples actually include 
home-based MNCs: consequently if these unobserved factors – forces associated with 
globalization - operate at the international level they will affect local MNCs and non-local 
MNCs differently. Therefore, the process is repeated, this time with domestic-owned MNCs and 
foreign-owned MNCs as the two sub-samples. Table 5 records the statistics from the raw data 
and Table 6 reports the structural test results. 
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Table 5: Interdependence and Delegation: Domestic MNCs and Foreign MNC’s 
 
  
 
Domestic-owned MNC's Foreign-owned MNC's 
Variable Mean St. Dev. 
 
No. 
Obs. Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
No. 
Obs. 
Interdependence             
Proportion of wage bill spent 
on training 3.21 2.83 660 3.29 2.83 747 
Proportion of employees having 
training in the last year 44.94 29.28 794 53.98 
31.4
7 922 
Formal analysis of training 
needs (yes/no) 0.75 0.43 1004 0.8 0.4 1102 
Number of employees has 
decreased in last 3 years 
(yes/no) 0.06 0.23 1004 0.05 0.21 1102 
% Decrease in employees 18.22 19.79 772 21.85 
22.3
8 808 
Harsher methods employed to 
decrease workforce (yes/no) 0.59 0.49 1004 0.62 0.48 1102 
Greater use of more flexible 
employment (yes/no) 0.66 0.47 1004 0.69 0.46 1102 
Proportion of workforce 
temporary 2.75 1.27 934 2.84 1.32 1027 
Proportion of workforce with 
fixed term contracts 2.75 1.22 946 2.81 1.35 1025 
Delegation             
Pay bargaining above the 
establishment level (yes/no) 0.74 0.44 1004 0.7 0.46 1102 
Financial Participation 
(yes/no) 0.78 0.42 1004 0.71 0.45 1102 
Union penetration 4.14 2.06 981 3.9 2.12 1084 
Non-bargaining representation 
(yes/no) 0.75 0.43 1004 0.61 0.49 1102 
Change in upward 
communication in last 3 years 
(yes/no) 0.71 0.46 1004 0.76 0.43 1102 
Change in downward formal 
communication in last 3 years 
(yes/no) 0.88 0.32 1004 0.89 0.32 1102 
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Table 6: Structural Tests: Domestic MNC’s Vs. Foreign MNC’s 
Dependent Variable 
Mode
l 
Type 
Test 
Stat. Accept/Reject 
Interdependence       
Proportion of wage bill spent on training OLS 1.45 Reject at 5% 
Proportion of employees having training in the 
last year OLS 1.25 Accept 
Formal analysis of training needs Logit 32.9 Accept 
Number of employees has decreased in last 3 
years Logit 24 Accept 
% Decrease in employees OLS 1.12 Accept 
Methods employed to decrease workforce Logit 22.4 Accept 
Greater use of more flexible employment Logit 33.0 Accept 
Proportion of workforce temporary OLS 0.75 Accept 
Proportion of workforce with fixed term 
contracts OLS 1.38 Accept 
Delegation       
Pay bargaining above the establishment level Logit 36.3 Accept 
Financial Participation Logit 44.2 Reject at 5% 
Union penetration OLS 1.60 Reject at 5% 
Non-bargaining representation Logit 7.2 Accept 
Change in upward communication in last 3 years Logit 21.1 Accept 
Change in downward formal communication in 
last 3 years Logit 23.7 Accept 
 
 
 
 
 
The Tables show that, with a limited number of exceptions, MNCs pursue similar HRM 
practices within a specific locale regardless of whether they are foreign subsidiaries or 
indigenous home operations: in other words – it does not seem that country of origin effects are 
of overriding importance, other than in a limited number of areas. Hypothesis 2 is therefore 
rejected; MNCs generally behave differently to their country-specific counterparts, in both 
home and host countries.   
 
These would leave us with two remaining alternative hypotheses: hypothesis 3 or hypothesis 4.   
Hypothesis 3 suggests that MNCs tend to behave in a similar way in the manner in which they 
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manage their people. However, some differences were noted, reflecting differences in three 
areas that would make behaviour different in country of origin to other locales. First, there is the 
use of training: indigenous firms would probably be more fully aware of the limitations and 
possibilities of local training systems – particularly those operating at sub-national level - 
resulting in different approaches towards skills development, whilst foreign owned firms may 
seek to replicate the dominant approaches to training in their country of origin for the sake of 
familiarity or other reasons (Marsden, 1999).  Second, union penetration varies from country to 
country: unions tend to be stronger in collaborative market economies, and in certain types of 
emerging market than in mature liberal market economies and in less developed countries.  
Third, the varying willingness of firms to make use of financial participation may reflect 
particular ownership structures and/or company or sectoral specific ways of doing things 
(Pendleton, et al, 2003). Hence, whilst we cannot reject hypothesis 3 outright, enough 
differences remain to suggest that what MNCs do in people management remains a contested 
domain, as a result of the pressures of institutions operating at a range of levels, and/or 
variations in specific local conditions and the strategic choices open to managers.  On the base 
of survey evidence, Hypothesis 4 seems the most plausible MNCs may mimic the country of 
origin or host country
vii
.  This may reflect the contradictory effects of national regulation and/or 
the uneven diffusion of emerging transnational best practices (Pendleton, et al, 2003). 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION: MNCS AND HOST COUNTRY HRM PRACTICES 
 
 Previous research has tended to identify similarities between foreign owned and local firms. 
Some authors (Amante, 1995; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994; Turner, D‟Art and Gunnigle, 
1997) argued that this was evidence of MNCs adapting to local circumstances.  There is no 
doubt that local subsidiaries will by and large have to accept the limitations of local labour 
markets and local legislation, for example. Other authors who identified such similarities (Geary 
and Roche, 2001) argued that this was evidence of local firms emulating foreign MNCs and it 
seems likely that, to some extent, that would happen also. Our findings are more complex. There 
was some evidence of national recipes – in other words, most firms tend to do broadly similar 
things in particular places - though not fully on the lines of the business systems model 
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suggested by Whitley (1999); this would reflect inherent difficulties in categorizing different 
models of capitalism (Boyer, 2006), as well as the nature of internal systemic diversity.   
 
The study indicated that different patterns and types of ownership – be it simply on the lines of 
indigenous versus non-indigenous ownership or more complex variations in governance patterns 
- may make for different sets of practices within national business systems, echoing some of the 
most recent critiques of business systems theory (Brewster, Brookes and Wood, 2006; Streeck 
and Thelen, 2006;).    In other words, the study highlights the varieties of capitalism literature‟s 
relative neglect of the nature of internal systemic diversity: MNCs appear to do things differently 
to others firms within a specific national context, be the latter an MNC‟s country of origin or of 
domicile. 
 
 This does not, of course, mean that the only determinant of internal variety is MNC status; a 
dominant mode of practice by local firms does not mean that alternative viable and sustainable 
paradigms may be not be followed by a minority of firms (c.f. ibid.).  At the same time, the 
survey indicated no evidence of incoherence or “diffuse diversity” (in other words, a huge range 
of different practices within and across national economies).  Rather, we found evidence of 
alternative packages of practices - that were at least partially determined whether the company 
was international or not.     
 
For similar reasons, the research seems to have disproved cultural explanations: that what firms 
do always reflect either the effects of the dominant culture in their country of origin or operation.  
Rather, it would seem that what firms do represents a product of the relative strength of 
competing forces regulating their behaviour – formal laws, informal norms and practices, 
ownership structures, and relations with stakeholders.   More broadly speaking, this would 
highlight the limitations of any explanatory model that makes assumptions of path dependence: 
what firms do represents not just a product of context, but rather trade offs and compromises 
between competing pressures and influences. 
 
Although we found that MNCs are likely to do things differently to their non-indigenous 
counterparts, we similarly found no evidence of any particular model of behaviour common to 
all MNCs. There was no evidence of MNCs pioneering an emerging set of global best practices 
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that are disseminated into host countries.  This would reflect the competing pressures of local 
and national institutions, as well, as, in specific contexts, the product of transnational institutions 
such as the EU (Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997).  Whilst we have not tested such an 
explanation, our evidence would fit with the suggestion that institutions are nested at a range of 
levels, from local and regional to national and supra-national; making for alternative clusters of 
practices, some elements of uniformity and predictability to lower transaction costs between 
actors (Boyer, 2006; c.f. Marsden, 1999).   
 
These findings underscore the complex forces placed on MNCs: proponents of globalisation can 
get some support from our findings, but so too can those who argue for the importance of 
localisation.  There is much common ground in MNC practices within specific national locales 
irrespective of whether they are indigenous or foreign owned; enough to suggest that country of 
origin effects do not override practice in a wide range of areas. However, significant differences 
remain in three areas: training, union penetration and the existence of financial participation.  
Hence, we tend to believe that the evidence most strongly supports the duality perspective: 
providing a good fit with the expectations of authors such Evans et al. (2002) Gooderham et al., 
(1998), Kostova and Roth (2002) and Davis et al. (2000).  The findings also fit well with the 
conclusions reached from a study of a single MNC conducted by Almond et al (2005), and 
indeed, contemporary regulationist theories of institutional nestedness (Boyer, 2006; Boyer and 
Hollingsworth, 1997).  
 
In practice, different aspects of various models may coexist: different levels of union 
participation, for example, may or may not be associated with higher levels of participation 
and/.or higher security of tenure and/or the presence of individual mechanisms for involvement 
(Brewster et al., 2006).  This would suggest that any choices made by managers are constrained 
by a competing range of broader contextual realities, shaping decisions such as whether or not to 
deal with unions, the relative security of tenure accorded to employees, and the use of a range of 
forms of involvement and participation.  As noted earlier, this would underscore the effects of 
institutions operating at a range of levels, and the experimental nature of policy making by firms 
and governments. Sets of practices are replicated on the basis of complementarity (in other 
words, certain practices working better together than on their own) or, simply, the ability to 
coexist (in other words, the use of particular practices do not undermine the effects of the usages 
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of others) (Boyer 2006).   When confronted with a relatively strong national or sector specific 
labour movement, or formal trans-national regulations (e.g. European Union directives), 
managers may adjust their HR policies to make the best of these particular realities – in other 
words, seek to build complementarities.   Alternatively, they may seek to manage round them, 
combining what may be perceived to be international best practice (e.g. non-union forms of 
participation) with what they may be obliged to do in a specific national context (e.g. be 
constrained in their ability to hire or fire) – in other words, seek coexistence.  National 
institutions may not be strong enough to impose uniformity on what firms do in a wide range of 
areas, but neither are managers free to choose HR policies and practices – and other 
organizational policies and practices – without taking account of local rules, norms and 
conventions.    
Some of the differences between national-specific organizations and MNCs may be represent a 
direct product of size. Multinational organizations may be in a stronger position to depart 
somewhat from local norms, owing to their ability to exert pressure on national governments (on 
account of their being more mobile, and the resources they can bring to bear), but cannot ignore 
them totally. Again, larger organizations may be able to make use of bureaucratic economies of 
scale regarding general administrative burdens, freeing up resources to devote to developing 
more sophisticated HR systems where and when these may be useful (Brewster et al. 2006).  
Indeed, earlier research has indicated that international firms will have to be more sophisticated 
than those concentrating on local markets; environments are in a constant stage of flux and 
evolution necessitating sophisticated and strategic responses (Kim and Gray 2005: 823-4).    
 
The limitations of the data set make a more closely grained analysis impossible. For example, 
the available data does not allow us the kind of detailed analysis of the observed sample of 
MNCs necessary to detect whether there are any distinct national identities within this group. We 
cannot, therefore, contribute to the debate about whether US MNCs are more likely to 
standardise on a home country pattern than other countries‟ MNCs (Neghandi, 1986; Young, 
Hood and Hamill, 1985). Nor can we be fully confident that other measures of HRM might not 
have shown different results. Our data, taken from a single point in time, allows us to draw no 
conclusions about the convergence debate (Mayrhofer and Brewster, 2005). There is 
considerable scope for further research on these issues.  However, the evidence that we do have 
provides firm support for the duality perspective on HRM at the international level. 
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 CONCLUSIONS 
We found no evidence of the dominance of a coherent HRM paradigm reflecting the global 
dissemination of “best practices”. Rather than setting HR strategies on rational choice lines, 
managers seem to combine a range of practices moulded by institutionally-embedded 
opportunities and constraints operating at a range of levels. The results further revealed that 
isomorphic pressures operating at the country of domicile – or of origin - are not sufficiently 
strong so as to make MNCs mimic the HR practices of their local counterparts.  In turn, MNCs 
did not seem to act independently of context, either in imposing a new trans-national model of 
best practices, or adopting a diverse range of practices reflecting specific organizational needs, 
and managerial choices.  This would suggest two things. Firstly, institutions operate at a range of 
levels, from sub- to trans-national; firms will seek to respond to these pressures, in one direction 
or another, reflecting the relative strength of competing rules, norms and conventions, and 
interest groupings (Boyer, 2006). Whilst this might make for a myriad of different organizational 
responses, in practice, some clusters of practices are likely to emerge. This would reflect the fact 
that some practices work better together (e.g. high commitment work systems and supportive 
development policies) than on their own, the need for some predictability to lower transaction 
costs between the organization, and other actors and individuals (c.f. Marsden, 1999; Boyer, 
2006).  Secondly, whilst this would make for some diversity in practices in individual national 
economies – we found that in most cases MNCs behaved differently to their country-specific 
peers – this diversity was bounded; there was no evidence of “diffuse diversity”.  This would 
underscore the internal diversity of specific national business systems, with two or more – but 
only a limited number of - combinations of firm level practices readily coexisting in particular 
national contexts.  The latter seemed to be at least partially determined by MNC-status.  This 
points to the strength of the duality thesis which reflects the persistent effects of institutional 
realities: the fact that neither regulations specific to country of origin or domicile have a 
dominant effect would underscore the nested nature of institutions, moulding the practices of 
firms at supra-, national, and sub-national levels (Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997).   
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Appendix 1 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Dependent Variable Definition 
  
Interdependence  
  
Proportion of wage bill spent on training annual training budget/annual wage 
bill 
  
Proportion of employees having training in the last year trained employees/total employees 
  
Formal analysis of training needs 1 = yes, 0 = no 
  
Number of employees has decreased in last 3 years 1 = yes, 0 = no 
  
% Decrease in employees jobs lost/original number of 
employees 
  
Harsher methods employed to decrease workforce Compulsory redundancy, 
outplacement, 
 non-renewal fixed-term contracts or 
 outsourcing. 
  
Greater use of more flexible employment Temporary/casual, fixed-term 
contracts 
 or subcontracting/outsourcing. 
  
Proportion of workforce temporary temporary employees/total 
employees 
  
Proportion of workforce with fixed term contracts fixed term employees/total 
employees 
  
Delegation  
  
Pay bargaining above the establishment level 1 = yes, 0 = no 
  
Financial Participation Employee share options, profit 
sharing, 
 group bonus or performance related 
pay 
  
Union penetration union members/total employees 
  
Non-bargaining representation, i.e. JCC 1 = yes, 0 = no 
  
Change in upward communication in last 3 years 1 = yes, 0 = no 
  
Change in downward formal communication in last 3 years 1 = yes, 0 = no 
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Explanatory Variables 
 
Size Measured as the total number of employees at the 
establishment. 
 
Sectoral Dummies Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing. 
 
 Energy and water. 
 
 Chemical products; extraction and processing of 
non-energy minerals. 
 
 Metal manufacturing; mechanical, electrical and 
instrument engineering; office and data processing 
machinery. 
 
 Other manufacturing, (e.g. food, drink and tobacco; 
textiles; clothing; paper, printing and publishing; 
processing of rubber and plastics, etc.) 
 
 Building and civil engineering. 
 
 Retail and distribution; hotels; catering; repairs. 
 
 Transport and communication (e.g. rail, postal 
services, telecoms, etc) 
 
 Banking; finance; insurance; business services (e.g. 
consultancies, PR and advertising, Law firms, etc) 
 
 Personal, domestic, recreational services. 
 
 Health services. 
 
 Other services (e.g. television and radio, R&D, 
charities, etc) 
 
 Education (including universities and further 
education). 
 
 Local Government 
 
 Central Government 
 
 Other 
 
Country Dummies UK, France, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ireland, Poland, Finland, Greece, Czech Republic, 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria and Japan. 
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OLS Model: % Trained in Last Year 
 
     Pooled Sample    Domestic Firms     Foreign MNC's 
Variable Coeffic
ient 
t-
ratio 
Coeffic
ient 
t-
ratio 
Coeffic
ient 
t-
ratio 
 Constant 51.60 38.2 49.80 32.2 51.90 18.4 
Size 0.0000
1 
1.5 0.0000
1 
1.6 0.0004 1.3 
Agric -0.82 -0.2 2.24 0.6 -4.46 -0.4 
Energy 7.32 2.9 9.14 3.5 7.63 1.1 
Chemical 9.60 4.9 9.65 4.1 5.02 1.4 
Other Manu. -6.42 -4.7 -4.91 -3.2 -7.47 -2.5 
Building -5.95 -3.1 -2.94 -1.4 -11.90 -2.1 
Retail -0.04 -0.02 0.75 0.4 1.25 0.3 
Transport 0.86 0.4 3.13 1.4 -0.25 -0.04 
Bank 16.85 10.5 19.35 11.1 12.04 2.9 
Pers. Serv. -1.61 -0.5 1.62 0.4 -6.03 -0.7 
Health Serv. -1.88 -0.9 1.11 0.5 17.30 1.3 
Other Serv. 2.75 1.2 5.55 2.4 -1.10 -0.2 
Education 0.98 0.4 3.98 1.6 n/a n/a 
Local Gov. -1.03 -0.5 2.32 1.2 5.09 0.2 
Central Gov. 13.58 4.8 17.23 6.1 10.32 0.3 
Other 5.20 3.2 5.21 2.8 7.80 2.1 
France -3.54 -1.8 -3.23 -1.6 -1.84 -0.4 
Germany -21.19 -13.3 -22.00 -12.8 -11.27 -2.7 
Sweden 11.92 5.4 12.30 5.1 9.02 1.6 
Spain -1.51 -0.7 -5.02 -2.1 9.47 2.1 
Denmark -4.02 -2.1 -5.49 -2.7 3.02 0.6 
Netherlands -12.48 -5.2 -13.97 -5.5 -1.80 -0.2 
Italy -15.82 -4.3 -17.52 -4.6 3.02 0.3 
Norway -11.30 -5.8 -13.68 -6.7 8.33 1.4 
Switzerland -11.50 -4.0 -12.48 -3.9 -6.12 -1.0 
Turkey -4.63 -1.9 -4.66 -1.8 0.87 0.1 
Ireland -5.16 -2.7 -15.39 -6.8 12.68 3.4 
Poland -15.45 -5.8 -19.43 -6.6 -1.85 -0.3 
Finland 9.41 4.2 7.93 3.4 21.68 3.1 
Greece -17.04 -5.7 -20.10 -5.9 -8.47 -1.4 
Czech Rep. -7.08 -2.9 -7.64 -2.9 0.29 0.04 
Austria -17.52 -7.3 -18.75 -7.1 -10.72 -1.8 
Belgium -9.40 -4.1 -14.14 -5.0 -0.98 -0.2 
Bulgaria -36.55 -11.9 -36.67 -11.5 -32.33 -2.9 
Japan -21.94 -13.3 -21.60 -12.5 -15.61 -2.0 
       
Dependent 
Variable 
% trained in last 
year 
% trained in last 
year 
% trained in last 
year 
Mean 44.36  42.42  53.98  
No. of 
Observations 
5505  4583  922  
R-squared 0.15  0.17  0.11  
RSS 462936
1.1 
 367599
6.4 
 808926
.7 
 
 
F statistic = 
)2/()(
/)(
21'
'
knnRSSRSS
kRSSRSSRSS
sforeignmncdomestic
sforeignmncdomesticpooled


 
 
 = (4629361.1 – 3675996.4 – 808926.7)/36 
  (3675996.4 + 808926.7)/(4583 + 922 – 72) 
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  = 4.86 with a critical F(36, 5433) value of 1.6 at the 1% level the 
null hypothesis that the structure of the two models is the same can be rejected. 
 
 
 
 
Logit Model: Formal Analysis of Training Needs 
 
     Pooled Sample    Domestic Firms     Foreign MNC's 
Variable Coeffic
ient 
t-
ratio 
Coeffic
ient 
t-
ratio 
Coeffic
ient 
t-
ratio 
 Constant 1.62 17.6 1.59 15.1 1.51 7.4 
Size 0.0000
02 
0.6 0.0000
02 
0.6 0.0001 0.9 
Agric n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Energy 0.06 0.3 0.17 0.9 -0.39 -0.7 
Chemical n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Other Manu. -0.42 -4.8 -0.41 -4.3 -0.32 -1.5 
Building -0.42 -3.3 -0.34 -2.5 -0.31 -0.7 
Retail -0.50 -4.8 -0.42 -3.7 -0.78 -2.9 
Transport n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Bank 0.50 4.2 0.70 5.4 -0.39 -1.3 
Pers. Serv. -0.41 -1.83 -0.24 -1.0 -0.83 -1.3 
Health Serv. -0.53 -4.1 -0.40 -3.0 0.25 0.23 
Other Serv. -0.52 -3.6 -0.43 -2.8 -0.56 -1.2 
Education -0.43 -2.8 -0.32 -2.0 n/a n/a 
Local Gov. -0.68 -5.9 -0.57 -4.8 n/a n/a 
Central Gov. -0.16 -0.9 -0.02 -0.1 -0.76 -0.5 
Other -0.005 -0.04 0.01 0.1 0.02 0.1 
France 0.56 3.1 0.47 2.5 1.28 2.1 
Germany -0.78 -7.0 -0.84 -6.8 -0.32 -1.1 
Sweden -0.41 -2.8 -0.52 -3.2 0.14 0.3 
Spain 0.06 0.3 -0.17 -0.9 1.13 2.3 
Denmark -1.06 -8.6 -1.08 -8.0 -0.97 -3.3 
Netherlands -0.49 -2.9 -0.61 -3.4 0.38 0.6 
Italy -0.41 -1.5 -0.53 -1.8 0.75 0.7 
Norway -0.66 -4.9 -0.72 -4.9 -0.29 -0.7 
Switzerland -0.30 -1.5 -0.37 -1.7 0.13 0.3 
Turkey -0.70 -4.3 -0.80 -4.6 0.30 0.5 
Ireland -0.74 -5.6 -1.12 -7.3 0.25 0.8 
Poland -0.51 -2.7 -0.72 -3.4 0.56 1.1 
Finland -0.59 -4.0 -0.72 -4.5 0.67 1.0 
Greece -0.64 -3.1 -0.98 -4.3 0.91 1.6 
Czech Rep. -0.57 -3.2 -0.62 -3.2 -0.13 -0.2 
Austria -0.36 -2.1 -0.55 -3.0 0.87 1.6 
Belgium -0.70 -4.4 -1.00 -5.3 -0.02 -0.1 
Bulgaria -1.73 -9.3 -1.84 -9.2 -0.54 -0.8 
Japan -2.10 -19.1 -2.13 -17.9 -1.65 -3.7 
       
Dependent 
Variable 
Formal analysis Formal analysis Formal analysis 
Mean 0.668  0.643  0.797  
No. of 
Observations 
6939  5837  1102  
Log likelihood -4027.7  -3458.5  -516.7  
Chi-squared 767.1  687.3  79.4  
Degrees of 
freedom 
32  32  30  
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Likelihood ratio test is; )(2 ' pooledsforeignmncdomestic LLLLLLLR   
      = 2(-3458.5 –516.7 +4027.7) 
     = 104.9 with a critical Chi-squared(32 
d.f.) of 50.9 at the 1% level the null hypothesis that the structure of the two models is the same 
can be rejected. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
i
 see also Dunning, 1997; Gray, 1998; Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Prakash and Hart, 2000; Strange, 1998 Farnham, 
1994; Williamson, 1996; Moore and Lewis, 1999; Rugman‟s, 2001; Whitley ,1999)  for sceptical views on 
globalisation 
 
ii
 Including Turkey, a country that straddles two continents. 
iii
 
iii
  The ordinary least squares models are of the usual form; yi = α + β’xi + ui with yi being the 
dependent variable, α the intercept term, ui a normally distributed error term, xi the vector of 
explanatory variables and β’ their estimated coefficients. 
iv
 The logit models are estimated from ii
i
i
i ux
P
P
L 

 ')
1
ln(   where Pi is the 
probability that the dependent variable equals 1, 1-Pi is the probability of it being zero and Li is the log 
of the odds ratio. Since the log of the odds ratio is linear in the parameters the logit model can be 
estimated in the linear form (Gujarati 1995). 
v
 For the OLS models the structural test is a version of the Chow test where F statistic = 
)2/()(
/)(
21'
'
knnRSSRSS
kRSSRSSRSS
sforeignmncdomestic
sforeignmncdomesticpooled


 and RSS is the residual sum of squares from the 
pooled model, the domestic firm model and the foreign MNC‟s respectively, n1 is the number of 
observations from the domestic firm sub-sample and n2 the same from the foreign owned MNC sub-
sample, finally k is the number of parameters. The F statistic follows an F distribution with degrees of 
freedom (k, n1 + n2 – 2k) (Gujarati 1995). For the logit models the structural test is a likelihood ratio 
test of the form; )(2 ' pooledsforeignmncdomestic LLLLLLLR   where LR is the likelihood ratio and 
LL is the maximization of the log-likelihood function from the domestic, foreign MNC and pooled 
models respectively. LR follows a chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k is the 
number of estimated parameters (Greene 2000).  
 
vi
 An analysis examining just the flexible working practices elements of HRM, using a longitudinal sub-set of this 
data, found that country differences persist over time (Tregaskis and Brewster, 2006). 
 
vii
 An attempt was made to test hypothesis 4 further by estimating the models separately for US MNCs, 
UK MNCs and German MNC‟s, (these were the only countries having sufficient numbers to estimate 
the models). If MNCs behave the same irrespective of the country of origin, the dummy variables in the 
model will be insignificant: hypothesis 2 would be correct. Unfortunately, no coherent results were 
generated (sampling limitations precluding a more detailed analysis). 
